2014年4月30日 星期三

Peter Lynch 有關其麥哲倫基金的經驗 (I)

Peter Lynch 在其著作<Beating the street>中,分享了其打理麥哲倫基金的3個階段的經驗,一隻規模如此大的基金,是如何做到跑贏大市呢?

早期的麥哲倫基金(1977-1981)

富達公司將600百萬美元的麥哲倫基金與1,200萬美元的艾賽斯基金合併,成為總資產1,800萬美元由Peter Lynch 接手的基金。

在接手麥哲倫基金最初的幾個月,Peter Lynch 忙著調整投資組合,換上自己的心水及出售股票以應付贖回。在1977年12月底,其最大持股為Congoleum, Transamerica, Union Oil, and Aetna Life and Casualty。亦有Hans, Taco Bell 及Fannie Mae。

Peter Lynch 自己所說,他買入的股票沒什麼共通點,亦沒有全盤策略。

「The fact is that I never had an overall strategy. My stockpicking was entirely empirical, and I went sniffing from one case to another like a bloodhound that's trained to follow a scent.」

Peter Lynch 不受限制的挑選個股,雖然不少人將他的成功歸類為集中購買增長股。他自己郤不這樣認為。他認為只要發現股價被低估、盈利有機會回升。就算是公用股或大型的股份,只要有獲利的機會他都會買進。

「I was not constrained the way a manager of a growth fund was......I was free to wander off and learn that Alcoa's earnings were on the rebound because the price of aluminum was going up.」

「Flexibility was the Key. There were always undervalued companies to be found somewhere. Two of my biggest gainers in this early stage were major oil companies: Unocal and Royal Dutch. You'd expect a $20 million fund to ignore major oil companies and concentrate on smaller stocks with better growth rates, but I learned that Royal Dutch was turning around and Wall Street apparently hadn't realized it, so I bought Royal Dutch. At one point when Magellan was still a pip-squeak fund, I put 15% of the assets into utilities. I owned Boeing and Todd Shipyards right along with Pic'N' Save and Service Corporation International, the MacDonald's of funeral home. I doubt that I was ever more than 50% invested in the growth stocks to which Magellan's success is so often attributed.」

早期麥哲倫基金其中一個特點是股票換轉率非常之高,第一年組合內有41隻股票,周轉率343%,之後3年每年也達300%,這是由於基金規模小,如果發現更好的目標就要賣出舊股才有資金買,而另一原因是贖回的壓力相當大。

「Rather than being constantly on the defensive, buying stocks and then thinking of new excuses for holding on to them if they weren't doing well, I tried to stay on the offensive, searching for better opportunities in companies that were more undervalued than the ones I'd chosen.」

「Most of my abrupt changes in direction were caused not by any shift in policy but by my having visited some new company that I liked better then the last. I might have preferred to own both, but in a small fund in which shareholders continued to seek redemption, I did not have that luxury.」


書中的回報資料
               Magellan          S&P
1979          51%              18.44%  
1980          69.9%           32%
1981         16.5%            -4.9%










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